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Abstract
We use firm-level data to investigate the impact of taxes on the international lo-
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statutory tax rate in the target country is found to have a negative impact on the prob-
ability of an acquisition in that country. In addition, the estimated size of the effect
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of corporate taxation on the choice of the international
location of a target company by an acquiring company. We estimate a form of the ran-
dom parameters logit model which examines the role of taxation in the location choice -
between the home country and a number of foreign countries- conditional on an acquisition
taking place, and controlling for other determinants of this choice. Surprisingly, given the
importance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in aggregate foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), the impact of taxation on the location of targets in international mergers
and acquisitions has not been thoroughly investigated before.
The growth of international cross-border M&A is well documented. The UNCTAD 2017
World Investment Report states that globally, the total value of cross-border M&A sales in
2016 was $869 billion, representing around 50% of total FDI flows. Both this nominal value
and the proportion of total FDI are the highest since just before the financial crisis in 2007,
which was an exceptional year.1
There is a very large literature on the impact of taxes on FDI. Surveys and meta-analyses
include de Mooij and Ederveen (2008), and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). This literature finds
a substantial impact of taxation. For example, the meta analysis of Feld and Heckemeyer
estimates that the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the tax rate is around -2.5. The flow
of FDI from country i to country j depends on both extensive and intensive margin decisions.
On the extensive margin an investor in i must choose between greenfield investment and
acquiring an existing business, and in the latter case between targets in alternative locations.
Conditional on those choices, there may also be intensive margin decisions about how much
to invest. In this paper we focus on just one aspect of these decisions: conditional on the
decision to acquire an existing business, the impact of taxation on the location of the target
business, including the home country as well as alternative foreign countries.
1Another measure of the importance of cross-border M&A is provided by Erel et al. (2012), who report
that the volume of cross-border acquisitions grew from 23% of total merger volume in 1998 to 45% in 2007.
A useful description of the pattern of cross-border M&A activity prior to the financial crisis is provided by
Brakman et al. (2007).
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We are not aware of any other paper that focuses specifically on this decision. Some other
papers that analyse the location of cross-border M&A control for differences in taxation, but
this literature pays little attention to the role of taxation. The closest approach to ours in the
existing literature is Bertrand et al. (2007) who estimate a conditional logit model over 400
European cross-border acquisitions in the 1990s, and include tax amongst the explanatory
variables. However, they have little discussion of tax effects, which are largely insignificant.2
Barrios et al. (2012) estimate a conditional logit model which examines the determinants of
where a company chooses to have a new subsidiary, and find that a one percentage point
increase in the host country tax rate reduces the probability of that location being chosen by
0.63%. But this study identifies a new subsidiary as a company that simply appears in the
database for the first time; this does not necessarily identify M&A decisions.
Other papers take different approaches in analyzing cross-border M&As. For example,
Di Giovanni (2005) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) examine the determinants of aggregate
M&A flows between bilateral pairs of countries, rather individual location choices, than using
data from 1990-1999 and 1985-2004, respectively. Both papers find a significantly negative
impact of corporate taxation in the country of the acquired company in the aggregate data.
Erel et al. (2012) explore the proportion of the total number of M&A deals in a country
that have foreign acquirers, and find a very weak effect of taxation in cross-section analysis.3
Again, however, they do not directly analyse the location choices of acquirers. In similar vein,
Herger et al. (2016) analyse the number of acquisitions taking place between bilateral pairs
of countries, and find an elasticity of the number of acquisitions to the international tax rate
of around -0.4. Hebous et al. (2011) consider the impact of tax on greenfield FDI and cross-
border M&A separately, using data on German parent companies, and find that the elasticity
of FDI with respect to taxation is higher for greenfield investment than for M&A. However,
they use a logit model, identifying separately for each possible location whether M&A takes
place, rather than directly examining the choice between different locations. Hanlon et al
2It is not clear exactly how the tax variable is defined in this study, which uses M&A data from the Kiel
Institute for World Economics.
3The tax variable is not included in the panel data part of the study.
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(2015) examine whether ”locked-out” cash, held abroad by US multinationals to avoid taxes
on the repatriation of profit, affects whether such firms undertake foreign acquisitions, and
find evidence that higher cash held abroad tends to be associated with a higher probability
of undertaking foreign acquisitions. This represents a different channel for the effects of
taxation than the one studied in this paper. None of these papers directly address the issue
studied in this paper - the location choice made by an acquirer, conditional on making an
acquisition.
By contrast, we use acquisition-level data on domestic and cross-border acquisitions to
directly estimate the effects of taxation on the location choice. We treat the choice of where
to acquire a target company as being made by the ultimate parent company, conditional on
choosing to make an acquisition. We provide a conceptual framework to show that the effects
of taxes on the location of targets can be heterogenous, depending on the characteristics of
the acquirer, target and acquisition. We derive testable predictions which we take to the data.
The econometric model we use allows for these heterogeneous effects. Further, we find that
our data do not support the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA),
inherent in a standard multinomial logit model. We therefore estimate the more general
random parameters model which enables us to allow for further heterogeneity in the effects
of taxes on location choices
Our conceptual analysis shows that the role of taxes on profits, and hence the probability
of choosing a particular target, is not straightforward. A starting point is that M&A will
only occur if it is expected that some surplus is generated. If that surplus is captured
wholly by the shareholders of the acquired company, then the acquirer is imply making a
zero net present value (NPV) investment. Any difference in tax between possible target
locations would be capitalized into the purchase price to keep the NPV equal to zero, but
differences in taxes would not affect the choice of target. For tax to affect the choice of target
it is therefore necessary for the acquirer to capture at least part of the surplus generated.
Assuming this, suppose that the acquirer is able to increase the revenue stream of the target,
through improved efficiency, greater knowledge or perhaps simply use of a brand name. The
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value of the revenue stream is reduced proportionately by the host country statutory tax
rate, and so a higher statutory rate would tend to reduce the probability of a particular
target being chosen.
In our empirical work, we combine data from two rich world-wide datasets from Bureau
van Dijk, ORBIS and ZEPHYR. We merge data on the M&A activities of companies as
recorded in ZEPHYR with their accounting data and ownership data from ORBIS structure,
to trace changes of ownership through M&As that occurred between 2006 and the end of
2016. We treat M&As in blocks of three-years waves (2006-2008, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and
2014-2016). Our main analyses are conducted using data for the period 2014-16, but we also
provide additional estimations using the earlier waves. Overall, our results suggest that the
host country tax rate has a significant negative effect on the probability of a company in
that country being acquired. Estimates vary across countries: specifically, the elasticities of
the probability of a target in country i being chosen with respect to the tax rate in country
i range from -1.1 to -1.7. We also estimate cross-elasticities; unsurprisingly these are much
lower.
The choice of target may also depend on the tax system in the country of the acquirer.
Where that country taxes worldwide profit, with a credit for host country taxation, then
the effect of host country taxation may be diminished. This element of the international tax
regime was the primary focus of the analysis by Huizinga and Voget (2009) who investigated,
in the context of cross-border mergers, which of the two companies involved in a merger
became the new parent company. For example, they cite the case of the merger which led to
a multinational firm with a parent (Daimler) located in Germany and a subsidiary (Chrysler)
in the US as resulting to a large extent from Germany exempting foreign source dividend
income while the US taxed such income (net of a foreign tax credit). We also find evidence
that the effect of corporate tax of the target’s country plays a less significant role, especially
for companies that were not previously multinational, when the rate is below that of the
acquirer’s country, and when the latter operates a worldwide tax system. This is consistent
with the acquirer taking into account home country taxation on profits earned in the target.
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This element of the tax system has also been found to be important in the location of parent
companies (see Voget (2011)), and in the location of new subsidiaries (Barrios et al. (2012)).
We also consider other aspects of the tax regime. For example, in considering the case
in which the acquirer may seek to shift production to a lower cost environment, the rate
of capital allowance in both countries may be a factor in the choice. This consideration
moves the analysis much closer to the conventional treatment of taxation in the case of
cross-border greenfield investment, where a conventional measure of the effective tax rate
becomes relevant.4 In the context of a cross-border acquisition, however, this effect is likely
to be secondary, unless the acquirer intends to undertake significant new capital expenditure
in the target, post-acquisition. An alternative may also be possible: that the acquirer can
generate a surplus by cutting costs in the target. In this case, more generous treatment of
those costs in the host country tax system would reduce the gain from cutting costs. Perhaps
reflecting these alternative possibilities, we do not find a significant role for capital allowances.
As well as investigating heterogeneity across parent countries depending on their tax
regimes, we also investigate heterogeneity due to differences in parent company characteris-
tics. For example, it seems plausible that there is some element of fixed costs in undertaking
cross-border investments. Such costs are less significant for larger acquisitions; they may also
be smaller for companies which already have some foreign activities which may already have
paid some or all of such costs. The impact of marginal tax differences between locations
may therefore differ between large and small acquirers, between previously purely domestic
acquirers and companies that are already multinational, and between locations depending
on whether the acquirer already has a presence there. We investigate these sources of het-
erogeneity. We find that “domestic companies” (companies that did not own any foreign
subsidiaries in the base year), are less sensitive to taxation than multinationals in the choice
of whether to acquire a target domestically or abroad; this may reflect higher fixed costs
4See Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) for earlier analyses of these issues
with respect to greenfield investment. Recent studies which try to define the effective tax rate (ETR), use
assumptions regarding how the parent and the host country tax rates interact with each other. For example,
Barrios et al. (2012) as well as Huizinga and Voget (2009), construct an ETR based on the subsidiary’s
pre-tax income which is endogenous since this depends on the actual location choice.
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for domestic companies, relative to the expected surplus. However, domestic companies are
found to be more sensitive to taxation when choosing between different cross-border loca-
tions. This may reflect the possibility that larger companies, especially those that are already
multinational, have more experience of tax planning, making them more able to shift profits
between countries and hence making them less sensitive to differences in the statutory tax
system in choosing between alternative target companies.
Of course, in attempting to identify the impact of taxes we need to control for many
other factors that are relevant for domestic and cross-border mergers. Cross border M&As
induced by differences in the valuation of the target and the acquirer has been the focus of
much recent empirical literature. Examples of reasons for differences in valuation explored
include: the imperfect integration of capital markets (Erel et al. (2012)); arbitrage generated
through mispriced securities (Baker et al. (2009))5; weak investor protection and accounting
standards (Erel et al. (2012), Rossi and Volpin (2004)); the size of foreign portfolio ownership
of target companies (Ferreira et al. (2010)); and the quality of the structure of governance
in countries (Ellis et al. (2011), Col and Errunza (2015)). We attempt to control for such
effects in our empirical analysis.
Section 2 presents the conceptual framework to explore the role of taxes. In Section 3,
we set out our empirical methodology and describe the data in more detail. In Section 4 we
present our results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The role of tax in the choice of location of targets
There have been many theoretical contributions on the role of M&As in the development of
multinational companies.6 Very broadly, these tend to distinguish two motives: an efficiency
motive where gains arise through economies of scale, internal technology transfer or coordi-
5This could arise due to overpricing of the acquirer (the “cheap financial capital” hypothesis, similar to
the model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) or underpricing of the target (the “cheap assets” hypothesis, similar
to the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).
6See, for example, Ferrett (2005), Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008), Neary (2007)
and Neary (2009), Norback and Persson (2007), Hijzen et al. (2008), Raff et al. (2009), Sta¨hler (2014).
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nation of decision making, and a strategic motive, where firms seek to enter foreign markets
to reduce competition within their market. The extent of these motives may differ between
firms, and across countries. For example, the strategic motive depends on the degree to which
the markets in the two countries are integrated.7 We do not set out a complete model of
acquisitions, but draw from this literature to consider a simple conceptual framework which
allows us to explore some testable hypotheses regarding the effects of corporation tax on the
choice of a target company by an acquirer.
We assume that the acquiring company is resident in country h, and seeks to acquire
a target company in country j. The target may be in a foreign country, j 6= h, or in the
domestic country j = h. Throughout we assume that the targets represent mutually exclusive
investment opportunities, which implies that the decision to be made by the acquirer is the
choice of a single target. This could be justified on a number of grounds: for example, that
there may be a need for a specific investment in some element of a supply chain, or that the
acquirer may be unable to raise enough funds to undertake more than one acquisition. In
this case, the acquirer will choose a target in country k, instead of any other country j, if
Sk > Sj, ∀j 6= k. (1)
where Sj is the post-tax surplus (or economic rent) captured by the acquirer from acquiring
a target in j. In the empirical work below, we condition on an acquisition taking place.
Acquisitions occur when merging two corporations is expected to increase private value.
Any changes in value must ultimately be reflected in changes in revenue and/or costs. We
consider changes in revenue and costs separately in order to identify the impact of taxation on
the choice of the target company by the acquirer. We focus on effects in the target company;
a direct impact on the acquirer that is common across potential targets would not affect the
choice of target. The central question posed here is whether, and how, tax may affect the
7Greenfield investment has very different strategic implications from acquisition. Host country govern-
ments also sometimes view inbound investment in the form of an acquisition rather differently from inbound
greenfield investment, on the grounds that it primarily constitutes a change of ownership rather than an
addition to the country’s capital stock, see Dinc and Erel (2013), and Bertrand et al. (2012). We do not
explicitly consider greenfield investment choices in this study.
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choice of where to acquire a target. To begin, we define the post-tax surplus accruing to the
acquirer from acquiring target j as:
Sj = δj
{
S∗j − Tj
}
(2)
where δj is the share of the overall surplus generated by the acquisition that is captured by
the acquirer, which depends on the acquirer’s bargaining strength and possibly competition
from other potential acquirers; S∗j is the total pre-tax surplus generated from the acquisition;
Tj is the change in the total tax liability associated with the surplus generated from acquiring
target j.
The pre-tax surplus is defined as
S∗j = ∆Yj −∆Cj − Fj (3)
where ∆Yj is the present value of the increase in revenue generated in target j, relative to
target j’s revenue if the acquisition did not take place; ∆Cj is the present value of the change
in costs in the target, relative to target j’s costs if the acquisition did not take place; and
Fj is a fixed cost associated with acquiring the target. The values ∆Yj and ∆Cj depend
on discount factors, which may in principle differ between potential acquirers and between
an acquirer and the current owners of the target. We do not focus on such differences here,
since we are primarily concerned with the choice of target by a specific acquirer. Note that
in the case in which discount factors are common between two or more potential acquirers, if
they seek to outbid each other by raising the price of the target, then this will tend to reduce
δj. As in Bertrand competition, this may potentially reduce δj to zero, hence reducing the
surplus to the potential acquirers to zero, and leaving the current owners of the target to
benefit from the whole surplus created by an acquisition by either acquirer. In this (extreme)
case, the acquisition would represent a zero net present value investment by an acquirer. If
this were true across all potential targets, then tax would not affect the choice of target. In
what follows, we assume that δj > 0. Ceteris paribus, a higher δj makes an acquisition of
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target j more likely.
The tax liability on the surplus generated by acquiring target j is:
Tj = τhj {∆Yj − θj∆Cj − ηhjFj} (4)
Statutory tax rates are τh in the acquirer’s country and τj in the target’s country. However,
the overall tax rate may include both corporation tax on profit generated in the target,
withholding taxes levied in the target country on income remitted to the acquirer, and any
residual tax levied in country h. We denote the overall tax rate applied to income generated
in country j, but accruing to the acquirer in country h, as τhj. It is possible that only
a proportion of the present value of costs can be set against tax - for example, capital
expenditure is typically depreciated over time, reducing the present value of deductions. The
proportion applied to costs C in country j is θj; the proportion of fixed costs allowable against
tax is ηhj. In practice the tax base typically exceeds the pre-tax surplus, with θj < 1 and
ηhj < 1, so that Tj > τhjS
∗
j .
From (4) it is immediately clear that, as long as the tax base is positive, then a rise in
τhj increases the tax liability associated with target j. Abstracting from the extreme case in
which a rise in the host country statutory tax rate τj does not raise τhj (which we discuss
further below), this implies from (1) and (2) that, conditional on S∗j :
Proposition 1. The probability of acquiring a target in a particular country falls as the
overall statutory tax rate for an acquisition in that country rises.
This is the central proposition tested in this paper. However, there may be heterogeneity
in responses to taxation, which we now examine.
First, the impact of taxation may depend on the size of the differential in the pre-tax
surplus between the best outcome and the second-best outcome. Suppose that in the absence
of tax the highest surplus is generated from target k, and the second highest surplus from
target m, with the difference given by A∗km = S
∗
k − S∗m > 0. The acquirer would choose m
only if Sk < Sm. Abstracting from possibly different bargaining strengths, and tax allowance
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rates, in the target countries this would require τhk > τhm. The higher is A
∗
km, the greater the
difference in tax rates τhk − τhm that would be required for the acquirer to choose m. Or, to
put it another way, differences in tax rates are less likely to affect the choice of target if A∗km
is large. This may be the case, for example, of the position of a purely domestic company
seeking to acquire abroad for the first time, implying high fixed costs from a cross-border
acquisition, and hence that the surplus from acquiring a domestic target (in this case, country
k) could be much higher than the surplus from acquiring a foreign target. So in this case
the choice of target may be less sensitive to differences in taxation between domestic and
foreign locations. The opposite may be true for very large companies, for whom fixed costs
are relatively small, and who are able to collect detailed information from a greater range of
the available targets, and so are more likely to to find a comparison between the two best
outcomes yields a relatively low value of A∗km. In such cases, taxes may therefore be relatively
more likely to affect the choice of target. In general:
Proposition 2. The choice of a target is less sensitive to taxation when differences in the
pre-tax surplus between targets are greater.
We investigate Proposition 2 empirically by allowing the impact of taxation to differ
between: (a) acquirers that are domestic or multinational prior to the acquisition; (b) small
and large acquirers; (c) domestic and foreign acquisitions; and (d) acquisitions in countries
where the acquirer already has a presence and those in which it does not.
Second, the impact of taxation on the choice of target may also be lower if the acquirer is
a multinational company with the experience and capability of shifting taxable profit to low
tax jurisdictions to reduce its overall tax liability.8 Suppose for example, that the acquirer is
able to shift a proportion ψ of its tax in any jurisdiction to a tax haven, and thereby escape
tax on that proportion of its profit. Then (simplifying for expositional purposes by setting
8For empirical evidence on this topic, see Egger et al. (2010) and Egger et al. (2014), who use German
data, and Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), who trace the effect of positive earnings shocks at the parent level
on the profit of low-tax subsidiaries. See Dharmapala (2014) for a recent review of the vast literature on the
effect of taxes on profit shifting.
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δk = δm) it is possible that:
Tk − Tm > S∗k − S∗m > (1− ψ) {Tk − Tm} (5)
That is, it is possible that in the absence of profit shifting the difference in statutory tax
liabilities Tk−Tm may outweigh the difference in pre-tax surpluses (so that the acquirer would
choose target m), but that this is reversed when profit shifting is taken into account. A high
tax rate in country k is therefore less likely to affect the choice of target in the presence of
profit shifting. This is intuitive: tax is less likely to affect the choice of target company when
the acquirer has more opportunities to avoid taxes. This effect may be more pronounced if
ψ differs between potential target countries. Hence:
Proposition 3. The impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target is weaker
when the acquirer is more able to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.
In our empirical work, we investigate this proposition by allowing the effects of taxation
to depend on two factors, which may reflect the ability to shift profit: (a) whether or not a
company is a multinational prior to the acquisition, and (b) the size of the acquirer.
Third, the impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target may depend
on the tax system in the country of the acquirer. In the simplest case, in which there are
no withholding taxes on dividends, and in which the home country h does not tax income
generated in country k, then τhk = τk and hence ∂τhk/∂τk = 1. However, suppose country h
seeks to tax worldwide income, with a credit for any tax paid in k (as was, for example, the
case for the USA until 2017, and the UK until 2009). If country k is the home country (h = k)
then τhk = τk since (in the absence of withholding taxes) there is generally no additional tax
on dividends paid within the home country. But if k is a foreign country, then in the extreme
case in which there is no deferral of the repatriation of profit, then τhk = max{τh, τk}. In this
extreme case, if τh > τk, then ∂τhk/∂τk = 0: a marginal rise in the tax rate in k would have
no effect on the cut-off value τhk. In practice, country h tax can be deferred until the profit
is repatriated, and hence the present value of the country h tax is reduced. But as long as
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there is still some residual country h tax, then ∂τhk/∂τk < 1. That is, the sensitivity of the
overall tax rate to changes in the statutory tax rate in country k is lower, and a rise in the
statutory rate in k is less likely to move the overall tax rate across the cut-off threshold, τ ∗hk.
In sum:
Proposition 4. The impact of the statutory tax rate in the country of the target is weaker
when the country of the acquirer taxes the worldwide income of its resident companies with a
credit for tax paid abroad, and the tax rate in the country of the target is lower than the tax
rate in the country of the acquirer.
In our empirical work, we investigate this proposition by allowing the effects of taxation
to be different in the case described in this proposition.9
Next, we consider the impact of allowances in the target country. There are two possi-
bilities here. The first is that the acquirer expects to earn a surplus by cutting costs in the
target, so that ∆Cj < 0. The net gain from cutting costs is Sj = −δj(1 − θjτhj)∆Cj > 0;
since ∆Cj < 0, a higher allowance rate implies a smaller impact on the surplus.
10 Intuitively,
a more generous allowance rate reduces net costs in the target; so the gains from cutting costs
in this case are smaller. An acquirer seeking to reduce costs in the target would therefore
prefer a lower allowance rate. The acquirer would prefer a lower tax rate, τhj, for the same
reason: a higher tax rate reduces the gains from reducing costs. The second possibility is that
the acquirer plans to expand production in the target post-acquisition. This is akin to an
acquisition creating the opportunity for additional new greenfield investment, which would
increase the income stream as well as increasing costs. In this case ∆Cj > 0, and a higher
allowance reduces the net cost of the new investment and hence creates a smaller reduction
in the surplus. An acquirer seeking to increase costs in the target would therefore prefer a
higher allowance rate. In this case a higher tax rate would increase the value of allowances,
but assuming that the overall surplus is positive, this effect would be outweighed by the tax
9We abstract from other tax consequences that may arise in the acquirer’s country. For example, the
acquirer may receive additional tax relief for interest paid on borrowing to acquire a target. As long as this
does not vary between potential targets, then this would not directly affect the choice of target. Our focus
is on the impact of differential taxes between targets.
10It is straightforward to see that in this case ∂Sj/∂θj = δjτhj∆Cj < 0.
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on the higher revenue generated. A more general approach in the case of additional greenfield
investment is to consider the effective average tax rate (EATR), which reflects both the effect
of the statutory tax rate on the income stream, ∆Yj, and the impact of the statutory rate
and the allowance on the net cost of an investment, ∆Cj. This has previously been shown to
be significant for firm location decisions and for flows of foreign direct investment (see., for
example, Devereux and Griffith, 1998, and De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). Hence we have:
Proposition 5. If the acquirer intends to reduce costs in the target, then a higher rate of
tax allowance in the target country reduces the probability that a target is acquired in that
country. But if the acquirer intends to undertake additional investment in the target, then
a higher rate of tax allowance in the target country increases the probability that a target is
acquired in that country; in this case, a higher effective average tax rate reduces the probability
that a target is acquired in that country.
We therefore have opposite predictions for the allowance rate, depending on the intention
of the acquirer to increase or reduce costs. In our empirical work, we do not observe the
intention of the acquirer. We can therefore find only an overall effect of the rate of allowance
on the probability of a target being chosen.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Methodology
Our econometric model is informed by our discussions in Section 2. To capture variation
even across similar types of firms we allow each parent company to have a different tax effect
with the mean effect dependent on company characteristics.
An acquiring company, indexed by i, is assumed to acquire a target in country j (j =
0, .., J) which provides the largest expected surplus over all countries, where the latent surplus
associated with the target in country j is given by
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Sij = β
′
jzi + γiτj + αi + εij. (6)
zi is a vector of choice invariant characteristics and are allowed to have effects that are
choice specific. This includes parent country taxes and other base year characteristics of the
company. αi is an unobservable company-specific heterogeneity term that may be correlated
with included regressors. Since our model conditions on an acquisition taking place, we can
think of this term αi as capturing company specific selection effects. For ease of exposition,
we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable τ , say the target country specific
tax rate. In the estimated model we include other host country variables - see sub-section
3.2. We allow the parameter γi to be randomly distributed across the companies but the
mean effect to be dependent on some observable characteristics of the parent. That is, we
assume that every company in our sample has its own γi which is known to the company but
unknown to the econometrician, and write this as
γi = γ
′
0wi + σui where ui ∼ iidN(0, 1) (7)
i.e. γi ∼ iidN(γ′0wi, σ2). wi are company specific variables that are assumed to shift the mean
effect of γi. This model collapses to the standard multinomial choice model when σ = 0.
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Substituting (7) into (6) gives
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi + σui)τj + αi + εij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi)τj + αi + (στjui + εij). (8)
The company specific error term στjui also induces correlation between alternatives which is
not present in the standard multinomial choice model, and which relaxes the IIA assumption.
Also note that the new additional error term is now heteroskedastic due to the presence of
τj. Under the assumption that εij is iid Gumbel, the conditional probability (conditioned on
11It is customary to call the fixed coefficient logit model, a multinomial logit model when all the variables
are choice invariant and a conditional logit model when all the variables are choice specific. However, there
is no reason why one cannot have both types of variables in the model as we have. For ease of exposition,
we describe the model as a multinomial model when the coefficients are not random.
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γi) that alternative j is chosen will be of the form of the multinomial logit probability,
12
Prob(yij = 1|γi) =
exp
(
β
′
jzi + γiτj
)∑
l exp
(
β
′
lzi + γiτl
) (9)
where yij is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if company i chooses alternative
j.13 This model is known as random parameter logit model (RPL) with normal heterogeneity
since we have assumed the random parameter on the tax variable to be distributed as normal.
The new composite error term vij = στjui + εij will be a mixture of normal and Gumbel
distributions. Since γi is not known, we have to integrate out the u from the conditional
choice probabilities to obtain the unconditional choice probabilities,
pij = Prob(j is chosen) = Prob(yij = 1) =
∫
exp
(
β
′
jzi + (γ
′
0wi)τj + στjui
)∑
l exp
(
β
′
lzi + (γ
′
0wi)τl + στlui
)φ(u)du (10)
where φ denotes the standard Normal density. The log likelihood will consist of terms like
that in (10). The model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood using the fact that
(10) is a calculation of an expected value. We replace the integral by a sample average of the
function constructed by drawing enough observations from φ(u) to calculate this average. It
can be shown that this sample average consistently estimates the choice probabilities given
by (10). In our simulations we use 50 Halton draws.14
Relative to a standard multinomial logit model, because of the correlation between alter-
natives, this allows us to model (i) random variations in the response probability to changes
in variables, (ii) unrestricted substitution patterns, and (iii) correlated unobserved factors
12For notational ease, we do not explicitly state that the probability statements are all conditioned on the
observed data.
13Equation (8) collapses to the error components multinomial logit model when we only allow for a company
specific random intercept. Also note that all company specific covariates that have constant effects across
choices including the company specific unobservables αi, drop out of the equation.
14Although there are different ways of drawing random numbers from a particular distribution, the Halton
draws have been proven to be very effective; see Train (2009). The results were very similar with 50 and 100
draws.
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(Train (2009)).15
A few remarks are in order regarding the model specification and estimation.
(i) Although we have J + 1 alternatives, we only have J independent choice probabilities
(see equation 9. We treat the United States, j = 0, as the reference country and estimate all
parameters respect to this base case.
(ii) Our model allows for the possibility of domestic expansion. We allow some of the
variables to have different effects based on whether the expansion is domestic or cross-border.
Hence our model can be thought of as a form of a nested logit model (NLM) that allows for
random parameters.16
(iii) Alternative-invariant variables will not enter the choice probabilities unless they have
alternative-specific effects. One such variable that will drop out of the equation is the parent
country specific dummy. However, we do include the parent country tax rate interacted with
these country dummies. The latter is equivalent to allowing the parent country tax rate to
have alternative specific effects.
(iv) the main set of estimations allow for only the host-country tax rate effect to be ran-
dom, as the standard deviation of the domestic tax rate random parameter was insignificant.
3.2 Data & Sample Selection
The main data for our analysis come from the database ORBIS, compiled by the Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). This commercial world-wide dataset provides company-level accounting
information, and data on the company’s ownership structure in the form of a full list of
recorded shareholders. We use the ownership data in the years 2005 and 2013 to construct
a chain of majority-owned subsidiaries for each company, down to the 10th level of depen-
15The model parameters are estimated in NLOGIT 5 (NLOGIT, 2012) using simulated maximum likelihood
method.
16NLM relaxes the assumption of IIA inherent in the standard multinomial model by allowing for IIA
property to hold within each nest but not across nests. Allowing for random parameters within nests, as we
have specified, relaxes this IIA property within each nest too.
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dency.17,18 M&A activities are recorded in another commercially available dataset from BvD,
ZEPHYR. These were merged with the ORBIS data to trace the changes in the firms’ own-
ership structure through M&A. We select parent companies that are not defined as ‘micro’
by the European Commission (2003).19
Our full M&A dataset covers the period 2006 to 2016 which not only includes the financial
crises years, but also saw very large changes to cross-border acquisitions. To account for
these, we do not assume a stable relationship over time, but instead undertake our analysis
separately for blocks of time periods: 2006-2008, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016. Our
main focus is on the most recent period, but we also compare results for the different time
periods. Note that the samples do not contain the same companies in every block of years.
We select, for each block of years, a sample of parent companies that made at least one
acquisition during that block of years regardless of whether they already owned a subsidiary
in the new country or not. The ultimate parent of the group is treated as being responsible
for the expansions made directly and indirectly by its majority-owned subsidiaries. We use
ownership information to identify companies in the same domestic or multinational group
in our sample. For each block of years, the year prior to that block is used as a base year
to construct the initial organizational form of the parent. A company is classified as a
multinational company if it was connected by an ownership link - i.e. either owned by, or
owning - of at least 50 per cent of the capital to at least one other company located in a
different country in that prior year. The rest are classified as domestic companies, which also
include ‘standalone’ companies not connected to any group. We also use the prior year as
the base year to condition on other characteristics of the parent company. The final dataset
contains, for each parent company, a list of the location of all majority-owned subsidiaries
17Each year refers to the period 1st April of that year to 31st March of the following year.
18Our analysis was conducted in two phases. M&A activity observed between 2006 and 2008, along with
the ownership structure links observed up to 2005 come from an older version of the database. This older
version was no longer available to us at the time the paper was updated with the new results. All other
samples are instead built on a recent version of the database, made available in 2017. This new version had
data going back to 2008 and hence the first and the second block of samples have 2008/09 year in common.
Note, the sample of companies appearing in this common year is not the same in the two blockas due to the
way the ownership links have been created.
19Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two years of recorded total
assets greater than e2,000 and at least one employee.
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in each year between the beginning and end of each block of years. This identification of all
ownership changes due to M&A deals allows us to observe all majority-owned acquisitions.
The main model and the variations of this model are first estimated using the most recent
data from 2014 to the end of 2016. However, we also provide estimates using the earlier blocks
of data to assess the changes of the tax effects over time from 2006 to 2016. Thus, the main
dependent variable of interest in our model is the choice of the location of a target during
the period 2014-2016. If a parent acquires more than one target in a single country in the
same year, this parent is recorded as having made one location choice. We restrict the
sample to those companies that made only one location choice during the three year period
to avoid treating multiple acquisitions by a single company as independent; we also provide
some sensitivity analysis to relaxing this assumption. We also restrict our main analysis to
18 potential locations where nearly 99% of the targets of acquisitions were located during
2014-2016. In order to make our analysis comparable across different blocks of time periods,
and also to ensure that we had enough observations in each of the locations considered, we
restrict all of our samples to the same 18 potential locations.
Some summary statistics for the main sample (2014-2016) are provided in Table 1, which
shows that the full sample consists of 10,469 acquirers, of which 7,902 made only one acquisi-
tion in that period Considering also the parent companies making multiple acquisitions, we
observe a total of 15,014 acquisitions during this sample period.20 The rest of the table refers
only to the companies making a single acquisition in that period. 86% of the acquisitions
by these companies were expansions in the same country as the parent, and so we include
the alternative ‘domestic’ in the choice set. For a parent company located in one of the 18
countries, the choice set consists of 17 alternatives plus the “domestic” option. Table 1 also
shows that 31% of the companies making single acquisitions during 2014-16 were multina-
tional in 2013. The geographic distribution of the target and acquirer locations for the 7,902
acquisitions are shown in Table 2. The top two highest target locations overall were the UK
and Spain and the least common choice was Ireland. However, the UK and the US were
20The results from extending the sample to include multiple acquisitions is provided in Table 7.
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most popular for cross-border acquisitions. All targets in Switzerland were by acquired by
companies located elsewhere. Companies expanding into a new location represent 10% of the
total in our sample. The UK had the highest number of acquirers, followed by Spain.
3.3 Variables
We use a number of variables informed by previous literature and the theoretical frame-
work, to examine the determinants of M&A activity. We use three different measures of the
corporation tax system in each country: (i) the statutory tax rate (STR) is the headline
corporation tax rate in the host country, including typical local tax rates; (ii) the measure
of allowances reflects the present value of allowances for a unit of new investment, based on
a range of different assets; (iii) the effective average tax rate (EATR) broadly measures the
proportion of the net present value of an investment taken in tax. The tax variables used in
our analyses were obtained from a combination of data from the Oxford University Centre
for Business Taxation (CBT) Tax Database and from the KPMG Corporate Tax Reports.
The measure of allowances and the EATR are based on the methodology set out in Devereux
and Griffith (2003).
Clearly, we need to control for non-tax factors that affect acquisition location decisions.
Informed by the literature discussed above, we include a number of control variables from
various sources. We use data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)
on GDP, GDP growth, the cost of doing business, the business disclosure index, the unem-
ployment rate, the number of listed domestic firms and the extent of private access to credit.
These macroeconomic indicators are averaged over the three years preceding (2011-2013) our
estimation sample (2014-2016). We take a similar approach for the earlier blocks of years. We
use the CEPII GeoDistance database (Mayer and Zignago (2011)) from Porta et al. (2008)
to collect bilateral time-invariant variables between acquirer and target countries, such as
contiguity, common official language, simple distance between capitals, and common legal
system. The details of the variables and their construction and sources are provided in Ap-
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pendix B. Descriptive statistics for each variable for each of the 18 potential target countries
for the period 2014-2016 are shown in Table 3. The average STR across the countries chosen
for expansions, ranged from a low of 8.5% in Switzerland to a high of 35% in the US.
4 Results
We begin our presentation of results in Table 4 by estimating the RPL model, using the
sample from 2014-2016. We begin with restricted versions of our model in Columns [1]-
[2]. In Column [1], we allow for only a single effect of the host country tax rate, without
distinguishing between domestic and cross-border acquisitions or by type of acquirer. In
Column [2] we allow the effects of the host country tax rate to differ between domestic
and cross-border acquisition decisions. And in Column [3], to allow for the possibility that
multinational enterprises (MNEs) might for example be in a better position to avoid taxes
by shifting income to lower-tax jurisdiction (see Proposition 3), we also allow the impact
of the host country tax rate to be different between MNEs and domestic companies. This
is done by including an interaction between tax variable and a binary indicator variable
for whether the acquirer was a multinational enterprise in our base year of 2013 (indicated
by “MNE”). This means that in Column [3] we estimate 4 separate coefficients on the
host country tax variable. All models also include choice specific intercepts, and the parent
country tax rate, the coefficient of which is permitted to vary across the choices as shown
in (8). As discussed in Section 3.3, we also additionally include eleven alternative-specific
control variables in all specifications. The ‘distance’ measures are only allowed to affect the
cross-border choices. We report the coefficients of these control variables, but in order to keep
the presentation manageable, we do not report the choice-specific intercepts or coefficients
of the parent country tax rate.
The host country statutory tax rate has a negative and significant in Column [1], but only
for domestic acquisitions in Column [2]. In Column [3] this tax rate has a significant effect for
all four types of expansion. The first line can be interpreted as the effect of the host country
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tax rate for cross-border acquisitions for acquirers that were purely domestic in 2013; this has
a negative and highly significant effect. The significant positive coefficient reported in the
second line indicates that multinational companies respond less in cross-border expansion
than domestic companies to the host country tax rate. There is also a negative effect of
the host country tax rate for domestic acquisitions for domestic acquirers; in this case, this
effect is stronger for MNEs. In all of these columns, all 11 of the control variables are highly
significant, with plausible signs. In these and other columns we allow every parent company
to have its own tax coefficient for the cross-border choice, and we assume them to be drawn
from a normal distribution. The estimated standard deviation of this random parameters
(RP) term is also highly significant in every column except for Column [2]. However, since
Column [3] indicates that there is significant heterogeneity between domestic companies
and multinationals - and between domestic and cross-border acquisitions - in the impact of
taxation, we consider Columns [1] and [2] to be misspecified. The significance of the standard
deviation term in the other columns indicate that this random components model should be
preferred over the constant coefficient specifications. We also experimented with allowing
for a random tax effect for the domestic expansion choice but the results were qualitatively
similar and also the estimated standard deviation of the tax effect for domestic expansion
choice was insignificant.21 We therefore present results in which the tax effects are random
only for the cross-border expansions. We use Column [3] as our base model for exploring
various other forms of heterogeneity in responses to taxation in the remainder of the Table.
Prior to discussing the rest of the columns in this Table, we comment in more detail on
the different effects of the tax rate for the different types of company, and for the different
options in Column [3], and relate the results to the predictions in Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
Consistent with Proposition 1, we find a negative effect of the tax rate in the country of
the target for all cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Consistent with Proposition 2, we
21Allowing for random tax parameter for both cross-border (CB) and domestic expansion choices, produced
very similar results to Column [3] results with the standard deviation of the random tax parameter being
insignficant. More specifically, for CB and domestic expansion coices respectively, the estimated common
tax effects (standard error) were -15.298 (6.158) and -4.647(1.813): the Random Parameter SDs were 7.159
(2.126) and 0.642 (1.351).
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find a smaller effect of taxation on domestic acquisitions by non-MNEs, perhaps reflecting
a higher fixed cost of making a first cross-border acquisition. We further explore aspects
of Proposition 2 below. Consistent with Proposition 3, the results indicate that MNEs are
less sensitive to tax in choosing between cross-border acquisitions, perhaps, as noted above,
because they face lower costs in shifting profit to lower-taxed jurisdictions. This is consistent
with the findings from Egger et al. (2014) that host-country profit taxes have an insignificant
effect on companies which are able to avoid profit taxes.22
In Column [4] we explore Proposition 4, which indicates that the effect of the host country
tax rate may be smaller when the acquirer is resident in a country that taxes worldwide
income, with a credit for foreign taxes paid, and where the host country has a lower statutory
tax rate. This only applies to cross-border acquisitions, and in this period, most notably for
acquirers resident in the USA. We investigate this by allowing the coefficient on the host
country tax variable to differ in such circumstances. We find a striking effect for non-MNE
acquirers, with a large, positive and significant effect, which partly cancels out the overall
tax effect on cross-border acquisitions by these acquirers. There is a positive, but much
smaller and insignificant effect for MNEs; this is again consistent with the MNEs having
greater opportunities for profit shifting, or for deferring the repatriation of profit, so that
this feature of the tax system is much less important for them. The result for non-MNEs is
consistent with results in other contexts. For example, Huizinga and Voget (2009) find that
the identity of the parent following a cross-border merger depends on this effect (indicating
that acquirers are less likely to be located in the US, for example). Voget (2011) also finds
that such taxation in the country of the parent has a significant impact on relocation of
parents.
In Columns [5] and [6], we explore Proposition 5 which relates to capital expenditure.
22We have also included a term which interacts US multinational acquirer dummy variable with a domestic
acquisition dummy variable. The idea here is to address the issued explored by Hanlon et al (2015), that US
multinationals have ”locked-out” cash held abroad for tax reasons, which may be used for foreign acquisitions.
We find a positive effect for this interaction term, inconsistent with the proposition that US multinationals
are more likely to undertake foreign, as opposed to domestic, acquisitions. However, we do not have data on
cash holdings, and so we are not able to differentiate between US multinationals with different levels of cash
holdings.
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These consider the cases where it is intended to increase, or reduce, capital expenditure in
the target post-acquisition. The value of capital allowances should potentially play a role
here: more generous treatment of capital expenditure is beneficial when it is intended to
undertake more expenditure, but less beneficial when it is intended to reduce expenditure.
More generally, previous literature (for example, Devereux and Griffith (1998)) has argued
that the effective average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant measure of taxation for new green-
field investments. To the extent to which it is intended to expand the target company
post-acquisition, then the EATR would be relevant to the choice of target.
Column [5] uses the baseline of Column [3], but replaces the host country statutory tax
rate with the host country EATR, to see whether the EATR is the more relevant measure.
A problem here is that the two measures are highly correlated with each other, and so it is
difficult to determine separate effects of each measure. Including both tends to raise standard
errors, with few of the coefficients remaining significant. Including only the EATR, as we do
in Column [5], indicates that the estimated coefficient for EATR is now much higher than
the statutory rate effect.
Column [6] instead adds to the statutory tax rate a variable measuring the generosity of
capital allowances in the host country, allowing the coefficient to vary according to whether
the acquisition is domestic or cross-border and whether the acquirer is an MNE or not. The
effects of the statutory rates are very similar to our base specification in Column [3]. In
contrast, allowances do not play a significant role in either cross-border or domestic acquisi-
tions. This is consistent with Proposition 5 in that the sign of the coefficient on the allowance
could be positive or negative, depending on whether the intention is to increase or reduce
capital expenditure. If both types of acquirer are present, then these effects may cancel out
on average.
In Columns [7] and [8] we explore other possible implications of Propositions 2 and 3.
In Column [7], we investigate whether the effects of taxation differ according to the size
of companies, as well as differentiating between MNEs and non-MNEs. One element of
the discussion of Proposition 2 is that large acquirers may face smaller differences in pre-
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tax surpluses between potential targets - because their fixed costs are relatively small, and
because they may have the resources to investigate alternative options in more depth (and
are hence less likely to miss potential opportunities). Both of these factors would make larger
acquirers more sensitive to the host country tax rate. Offsetting this, larger MNEs especially
may be more able to shift profits to lower-taxed jurisdictions; which would make them still
less sensitive to the host country tax rate. We test these propositions in Column [7]. We
identify a “large” company as one that owned at least 4 subsidiaries (domestic or foreign)
in 2013. We have experimented by choosing different numbers of subsidiaries and report the
results with the highest maximized value of the log likelihood. The results of Column [7]
are mixed. The impact of host country taxes is not significantly different between large and
small MNEs, perhaps reflecting a trade-off between these two factors. But large non-MNEs
are more sensitive to host country tax for cross-border acquisitions, consistent with them
facing relatively low fixed costs compared to smaller non-MNEs.
In Column [8] we examine whether the effects of the host country tax rate depends on
whether an MNE acquirer already has a subsidiary in the target location in 2013. We find
evidence that the smaller effect on cross border acquisitions by MNEs is largely driven by
this factor. The host country tax rate has a similar effect for MNEs in new locations as for
non-MNEs. But the host country tax rate has no significant overall impact on the decision
by an MNE to acquire a new target company in a location in which it already operates. This
is consistent with Proposition 2 to the extent that there are substantial gains from expanding
in the same location, thereby reducing the marginal impact of taxation. These results are
also consistent with gains from profit shifting by MNEs being focused primarily in countries
in which they already have some presence, and hence expertise of the tax system.
Given a random parameter model for the tax effects, we can also use Bayesian shrinkage
estimator (empirical Bayes) to estimate this ’random tax effect’ for each company in our
sample our base model in Column [3].23 The model was estimated under the prior assumption
23The prior distribution of the random parameters is assumed to be Normal. i.e. This is the distribution
in the population. However, given the data and the estimated coefficients of the model, one can estimate the
distribution for the sample of companies (Train (2009)). This is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator
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that the unobserved company specific tax effects were drawn from a normal distribution. We
then recover the posterior estimate as the shrinkage estimate, which is plotted in Figure 1.
Only 13 companies out of 7,902 had an estimated effect that was positive.
We now consider the magnitude of the effects of taxes on the probability of location
acquisition choices. Table 5 reports detailed elasticities for the base case results in Column
[3]. Appendix A sets out how these elasticities are calculated; essentially they are an average
across all of the 7,902 acquirers. The diagonal (iith) shows the own-elasticity: the effects of
a 1 percent change in country i′s tax rate on the probability that an acquirer will choose a
target in country i. Note that the acquirer can be from any country. The off-diagonals show
the cross-elasticities: the ijth element shows the effects of a 1 percent change in country i′s
tax rate on probability that an acquirer will choose a target in country j. Note also that in a
standard multinational logit model, the off-diagonal elasticities would be the same for each
row by assumption; that is, a change in the tax rate in, say, Austria has the same effect on
the probability of a target choice in all other countries. This assumption is relaxed in our
RPL model.
Own-elasticities are generally quite large, ranging from around -1.2 to -1.7. This implies
that, for a typical country in our dataset, with a tax rate of around 25%, a reduction to
22.5%, for example, would increase the probability that an acquirer chooses that country
by 12% to 17%. Not surprisingly, the cross-elasticities are much smaller, although there are
interesting differences between countries; in particular changes in the US tax rate would tend
to have a large effect on the probability of choosing a target in other countries.
We next turn to the estimated effects of our control variables. All of the control variables
are significant in all of the specifications in Table 4 and the estimates are robust across
different model specifications. They also generally have the expected signs. Although GDP
has a negative effect, the effect coming from the growth of GDP is positive and higher than
the coefficient estimate on log GDP. Unravelling the two effects implies positive effects of
or Empirical Bayes estimator. Note, the method used is maximum likelihood estimation and the Bayesian
shrinkage estimator is used estimate the parameters at the end of the likelihood maximisation. See Appendix
A, equation (A.9).
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current and previous period’s GDP. That is, the size of the economy, measured by GDP,
has a significant positive effect on the probability of acquiring a target in a given country.
Also, as expected, targets are more likely to be in countries that are contiguous with the
country of the acquirer, that share a common language and a legal system and are closer to
each other. The cost of business start-ups and greater disclosure requirements have negative
effects on the probability of choosing a particular location. These variables may proxy for a
number of aspects of the regulatory framework in the choice country. The size of domestic
credit provided to the private sector has a positive effect. Conditional on these effects,
unemployment has a positive effect, which may reflect the relative availability of workers.
4.1 Variation over time
We now turn to the variation of tax effects over time. Table 6 contains the results from
estimating the base case RPL specification in Column [3] of Table 4 using the earlier three
blocks of data over the period 2006-8, 2008-10 and 2011-13. For ease of comparison, the
results for the period 2014-2016 are also reproduced in the last column. For conciseness, only
the tax variables are shown in the table; however all of the controls and other variables are
also included in all specifications, as in Column [3] of Table 4.24
The results are qualitatively similar over the four time periods. For the cross-border
acquisitions, the size of the coefficients are also broadly similar in three of the four periods.
However, for the period starting with the financial crisis in 2008, the coefficients (and the
standard errors) jump. This may signal extra sensitivity to taxation during and just after
the crisis, although the jump in the standard errors also suggests that the role of tax was
less well identified during this period. For domestic acquisitions, the role played by taxation
for domestic firms seems to have strengthened over time. There is no significant effect in the
first two periods, but the effect has gradually become much more significant However, the
impact of taxation on domestic acquisitions by MNEs has remained fairly consistent over
time.
24The detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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4.2 Some sensitivity checks
In Table 7 we report a number of extensions to the model and sensitivity checks, using the
initial 2014-16 block of data. As in Table 6, only the tax variables are shown. Again, however,
the specification is the same as in Column [3] of Table 4. Column [1] of the table reproduces
this baseline result for the purposes of comparison.
Column [2] presents the same model, but as a standard multinomial model with fixed
coefficients, without allowing for random variation in the effects of the host country tax on
cross-border acquisitions. As discussed above, these models suffer from the restriction of IIA.
The results are qualitatively similar to the RPL estimation. However, there is a difference in
the significance of the estimated effect of the host country tax rate on cross-border acquisitions
by domestic companies. This, together with the significance of the standard deviation of the
random parameter in Column [1] (and in the other columns), indicates the need to relax the
IIA assumption.
Column [3] investigates whether the results of the impact of the host country tax rate
could be due to correlation between the tax rate and the control variables. To examine
this we drop all the control variables. In the absence of the control variables, the estimated
effects of the host country tax rate tax on cross border acquisitions are somewhat higher
in absolute terms, and the standard errors are also higher. By contrast, taxation no longer
plays a significant role in the choice of domestic targets for purely domestic companies. This
suggests that the domestic control variables play a particularly important role in decision of
a company as to whether to expend abroad for the first time. It certainly seems plausible
that such decisions may depend on the characteristics of the domestic economy, as reflected
in the control variables. The significance of the tax rate is only apparent when we control
for these characteristics.
We next restrict our analysis in Column [4] to only cross-border acquisitions - as is more
common in the literature. This involves dropping 86% of the sample. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
dropping such a large part of the sample has a dramatic effect on the results, with none of
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the tax effects now found to be significant. This has important implications for studies that
ignore the domestic option when considering the location of M&A.
In Table 4 our analysis was restricted to acquirers that only made one expansion during the
time period 2014-2016. This induces a potential selection bias, since companies undertaking
multiple acquisitions may be more or less responsive to taxation than those making multiple
acquisitions. As a further sensitivity check, we take two alternative approaches. First, we
include all expansions that took place during the sample period - the results are presented in
Column [5]. To make this analysis feasible, we treat each acquisition as being independent –
in effect treating each of them as if they were being undertaken by a separate company. An
acquirer that has made, say 3 acquisitions, will therefore appear in the data 3 times. This
increases the number of acquisitions from 7,902 to 15,014. In our second analysis, in Column
[6], we include only the first acquisition made by multiple acquirers. This increases the
number of acquisitions from 7,902 to 10,469. Clearly, both approaches also have econometric
problems in that we treat the error terms (ui in (7)) as being independent. However, if
the selection is based on company specific characteristics that are time invariant, treating
each observation as random will not affect the bias in the estimator as these unobservables
will cancel out. The nature of the errors in each of these approaches is different from our
previous approach, and we can gauge how important these problems are by following these
approaches.
The results are shown in Columns [5] and [6] are qualitatively similar to our earlier
baseline estimates. The results for domestic acquisitions are very similar to Column [1]
both for multinationals and non-multinationals. The impact of the host country tax rate on
cross-border acquisitions are now higher compared to Column [1], and the smaller effect of
multinationals effectively disappears in the last column.
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5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of corporation taxes on the location choice decisions
of companies expanding through M&A. We provide a conceptual framework that identifies
heterogeneous effects of taxation, depending on the characteristics of the acquirer, target
and the reason for the acquisition. We derive testable predictions where we show that, in
principle, a higher tax rate in a country could reduce or leave unchanged the probability that
its corporations are the subject of an acquisition. We consider aspects of the tax regime in
both the target’s country and acquirer’s country, and also consider the role of allowances.
We use a random parameter logit model to allow for heterogeneous responses to tax rates.
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. The estimated average own-
country elasticities range from -1.2 to -1.7. So a 10% reduction in the corporation tax rate
of a country increases the probability of an acquirer choosing that country, conditional on
making an acquisition, by between 12% and 17%. These estimates are generally higher
than comparable estimates in the existing literature. However, the bulk of the previous
literature has addressed slightly different questions. Specifically, it has generally investigated
the extent to which the number of acquisitions in a country, or the proportion of domestic
targets that are acquired by foreign companies, respond to host country taxation. Implicitly
these approaches depend not only on the location choice, but also whether an acquisition is
made. By contrast our results are conditional on an acquisition taking place. This difference
in approach may explain the higher elasticities found in our study.
The elasticities estimated in this paper differ according to the characteristics of the ac-
quirer and whether the acquisition is domestic or cross-border. More specifically, we find
weaker evidence of an effect of taxation on the domestic expansion choices of domestic com-
panies, although their cross-border choices are sensitive to tax in the country of the target
company. By contrast, multinational companies are sensitive to taxes for both domestic and
cross-border acquisitions, although they are less sensitive to differences in taxation between
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cross-border acquisitions than are domestic companies. There is some evidence that these
effects are particularly strong for large companies.
We also present evidence that the host country tax rate plays a smaller role in the location
decision when the acquirer’s country operates a worldwide tax system with a credit for foreign
taxes, and where the host country tax rate is lower than the home country tax rate. This
is consistent with the acquirer taking account of home country taxation on future dividends
from the newly-acquired target company. Finally, we do not find a significant effect of
host country allowances, possibly because the sign of the effect would be expected to differ
depending on whether the acquirer plans to undertake additional new investment, or to
reduce planned future investment; in effect we estimate only the average of these opposite
effects of allowances in these two cases.
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Appendices
A Marginal Effects and Elasticities in Multinomial and Mixed (Random Pa-
rameter) Logit Models
The model specification for the latent surplus derived from a particular choice of a target
company in countryj(= 1, . . . , J) by acquirer i is given by
Sij = β
′
jzi + γxj + αi + εij (A.1)
where zi is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of exposi-
tion, we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target country
specific tax rate. The company is assumed to make the choice which gives the largest surplus.
Multinomial Logit Model
Marginal Effect of a change in location j specific variable xj (the target country j’ s tax rate),
on the probability of a particular choice of a target company in the same country j is
∂pij
∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= pij(1− pij)γ (A.2)
where,
pij ≡ Prob(j is chosen ) =
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
(A.3)
The corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xj
= (1− pij)xjγ (A.4)
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Similarly, it is easy to show that the cross marginal effect with respect to another location
m’ s tax rate is
∂pij
∂xm
=
∂
∂xm
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxm}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= −pijpimγ (A.5)
And the corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xm
= −pimxmγ (A.6)
Note, the elasticity in (A.6) does not depend on j.
We see from the above that a change in the tax rate at a particular target location will have
an effect on not just the probability of choosing that location but the probability of choosing
all other locations too.
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) or Mixed Logit Model
Instead of assuming that γ is fixed in (A.1), we now assume that every company in our
sample has its own γ and write this as
γi = γ
′wi + σui where ui ∼ iid N(0, 1) (A.7)
i.e. γi ∼ iid N(γ′wi, σ2). This model collapses to the earlier one when σ = 0.
Substituting (A.7) into (A.1), we get
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi + σui)xj + (σxjui + εij) (A.8)
Estimation of company specific effect γi
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ui in (A.8) is an unobserved company specific random variable. Then, by Bayes theorem,
the density of ui given data
f(ui|data) = f(ui|choices) = f(choices|ui)f(ui)
f(choices)
Thus,
E(ui|choices) =
∫
uf(u|choices)du =
∫
uf(choices|u)f(u)du
f(choices)
(A.9)
f(choices|u) is the conditional likelihood which appears in the likelihood function prior
to marginalisation, and f(choices) is the marginal likelihood which are obtained during the
maximisation. f(u) is the standard normal density by assumption in our model. The esti-
mated E(ui|choices) is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator.
Marginal effects and Elasticities
The conditional marginal effects and elasticities in this model will be given by equations
(A.2)-(A.6). In order to obtain the unconditional marginal effects and elasticities, one has
to marginalise this with respect to the distribution of the coefficients (i.e the random error u
here), which again requires simulations to approximate the integral as discussed above.
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B Variable Source
Variable Description Source
Tax Variables:
Statutory Tax Rate Main statutory tax rate, including typ-
ical local taxes
CBT database
Effective Average Tax Rate Effective average tax rate, using the
Devereux-Griffith (2003) method
CBT database
Allowance The present value of tax allowances per-
mitted per unit of investment
CBT database
Economic Indicators:
ln(GDP) ln of GDP (originally measured in con-
stant 2000 USD)
WDI, 2011
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) WDI, 2011
Cost Bus. Start-up Cost of business start-up procedures (%
of GNI per capita)
WDI, 2011
Bus. Discl. Index Business extent of disclosure index
(0=less disclosure to 10=more disclo-
sure)
WDI, 2011
Unempl. Total Unemployment (% of total labor
force)
WDI, 2011
Distance Variables:
Contiguity Dummy for Contiguity (=1 parent
country and alternative location share
borders)
GeoDist, 2011
Common Language Dummy for Common Language (=1
parent country and location have same
official or primary language)
GeoDist, 2011
Distance btw Capitals Simple distance between capitals (mea-
sured in km)
GeoDist, 2011
Common Legal Syst. Dummy for Legal System (=1 if parent
country and location have same Legal
System)
La Porta, 2008
Institutional Variables:
Corruption Score Average corruption score over the pe-
riod 1996-2000
WDI, 2011
Mkt Capit. To GDP Ratio of market capitalisation to GDP,
av. 1999-2003
WDI, 2011
Private Credit to GDP Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-2003 WDI, 2011
ln(No. Dom. Firms) ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av. 1999-
2003
WDI, 2011
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Table 1: Characteristics of Parent Companies
Number %
Total 10,469
Expanding Only Once 7,902 75.48
Multinational 
(a)
2,466 31.21
Domestic 5,436 68.79
Large 
(b)
4,921 62.28
Non-Large 2,981 37.72
Expanding Cross-Border 1,136 14.38
Expanding Domestically 6,766 85.62
Expanding to a New Location 
(c)
791 10.01
Expanding to an Old Location 7,111 89.99
Companies
Note: The table refers to all acquirers that completed one expansion between 2014 and 2016. 
(a) Multinational and domestic status is defined according to the ownership structure 
observed in 2013, percentages are with respect to the sample of companies expanding only 
once; (b) Size is defined according to whether the parents controlled 4 or more subsidiaries 
before 2014; (c) New Location expansion include all expansions made cross-border by 
domestic companies, and all expansions made cross-border by multinational companies to a 
location where they did not previously own any other subsidiaires.
Target Location Number % Cross-Border Acquirers Location Number % Multinational
Austria 83 32.5 Austria 100 60.0
Belgium 177 35.0 Belgium 182 44.0
Brazil 123 33.3 Brazil 83 6.0
Canada 244 26.2 Canada 180 53.9
Denmark 182 18.1 Denmark 149 32.2
Finland 219 10.5 Finland 196 31.1
France 605 8.6 France 743 42.0
Germany 652 19.2 Germany 735 39.7
Ireland 39 48.7 Ireland 55 54.6
Italy 67 91.0 Italy 6 0.0
Netherlands 404 21.8 Netherlands 422 30.1
Norway 187 11.8 Norway 208 31.7
Russia 351 4.0 Russia 342 10.8
Spain 1,493 4.1 Spain 1,483 17.0
Sweden 382 10.2 Sweden 343 28.6
Switzerland 45 100.0 Switzerland 0 0
United Kingdom 1,666 10.6 United Kingdom 1,701 20.6
United States 983 18.7 United States 974 56.6
Total 7,902 14.4 Total 7,902 31.2
 a) Target Companies  b) Acquiring Companies
Note. Listed countries are chosen as expansion locations, in the sample of 7,902 expansions completed during the years 2014-2016. These are 
the countries where the 99% of cross-border acquisitions take place over our observational period.
Table 2: Distributions of acquisitions
Table 3: Corporate Tax Rates and Explanatory Variables by Expansion Location Alternative
AT BE BR CA CH DE DK ES FI FR GB IE IT NL NO RU SE US Domestic
Host country statutory tax rate 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.35 0.25
Host country effective average tax rate 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.35 0.26
Parent country statutory tax rate 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
Parent country effective average tax rate 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.26
Parent country value of allowances 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.34
ln(GDP) 26.7 26.9 28.4 28.1 27.1 28.9 26.5 28.0 26.2 28.6 28.5 26.1 28.4 27.5 26.8 28.1 26.9 30.4 28.3
GDP Growth 0.36 0.46 3.26 1.50 1.09 0.62 -0.11 -1.84 -0.98 0.37 0.46 -0.52 -1.55 -0.39 0.74 1.15 0.88 1.05 0.07
Cost of Doing Business 5.04 5.48 6.06 0.40 2.34 4.94 0.08 8.96 1.02 0.90 0.62 0.34 17.24 5.42 1.76 1.98 0.60 1.22 3.33
Business Disclosure Index 5.00 8.00 5.00 8.00 0.00 5.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 3.40 7.00 6.00 7.60 7.08 6.97
Unemployment Rate 4.98 7.86 8.10 7.66 4.25 6.23 7.11 22.00 8.06 9.57 7.75 13.64 9.45 5.18 3.28 6.62 8.16 8.66 10.63
ln(Number of Domestic Firms) -7.35 -6.83 -5.93 -3.57 -6.33 -5.32 -6.62 -3.73 -6.90 -5.46 -4.23 -7.97 -6.14 -6.90 -6.60 -5.62 -6.18 -3.48 -1.51
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 96.3 56.2 57.0 145.7 163.1 87.2 188.1 162.5 90.2 96.0 175.3 126.5 92.3 116.6 126.1 44.8 127.8 185.7 140.3
Contiguity 0.63 0.76 0.00 0.55 0.62 0.53 0.21 0.36 0.13 0.42 0.11 0.37 0.30 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Common Language 0.67 0.77 0.00 0.88 0.69 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.68 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 1.00
ln(Distance Among Capitals) 6.77 6.01 9.06 7.52 6.73 7.04 6.59 7.34 7.33 6.76 7.00 7.17 7.29 6.33 7.06 7.71 7.11 8.72 0.00
Common Legal System 0.63 0.58 0.49 0.69 0.44 0.15 0.27 0.46 0.13 0.37 0.39 0.68 0.41 0.45 0.00 0.43 0.18 0.48 1.00
Note. The Table  reports the means for the variables used in the regression analysis. The tax data (1st to 5th row) were provided by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation database; alternative specific variables (6th to 12th row) were taken from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset, and they are avergaes over the period 2011-13; bilateral variables (13th to 16th row) were taken from the GEODIST database (Mayer and Signago, (2011)) and La Porta et al. (2008).
Table 4: Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model estimates
Common tax 
effect
Tax effect by  
type of 
expansion
Baseline
Specification
Parent vs
Host
Country
Taxes
Effective
Averate
Tax Rate
Statutory
Tax Rate &
Allowances
Large & Small 
Acquirers
New & Old 
Expansion 
Location
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Cross Border expansions:
Host-country Statutory Tax Rate (tj) -14.634*** -7.648 -16.439*** -13.867** -16.580*** -15.603*** -12.169**
(2.306) (4.795) (6.115) (6.554) (6.357) (6.021) (6.058)
tj * MNE dummy 6.377*** 4.921** 5.690*** 7.345*** 1.005
(1.671) (2.002) (1.895) (2.561) (1.126)
tj * large non-MNE dummy -4.145***
(1.481)
tj * large MNE dummy -2.324
(2.076)
tj * dummy =1 for MNE expanding in a old location 15.589***
(2.718)
tj * non-MNE dummy * dummy = 1 for credit system and th>tj 7.717***
(2.316)
tj * MNE dummy * dummy = 1 for credit system and th>tj 1.885
(1.759)
Host Country Effective Average Tax Rate (EATRj) -50.351***
(8.169)
EATRj * MNE dummy 20.878***
(2.967)
Host Country Tax Allowances -4.289
(3.000)
Host Country Tax Allowances * MNE dummy 1.042
(1.101)
Domestic expansions:
Domestic  Statutory Tax Rate (th=tj) -8.053*** -4.754*** -3.328* -4.827** -4.595** -3.283*
(1.526) (1.794) (1.789) (2.094) (1.873) (1.723)
th * MNE dummy -4.654*** -5.840*** -4.437*** -2.582 -5.883***
(0.774) (0.881) (1.578) (2.098) (0.769)
th * large non-MNE dummy -1.076
(1.293)
th * large MNE dummy -2.504
(1.995)
Domestic Effective Average Tax Rate (EATRh=EATRj) -8.523**
(3.696)
EATRh * MNE dummy -4.359***
(1.351)
Domestic Country Tax Allowances -0.360
(2.330)
Domestic Country Tax Allowances * MNE dummy 0.754
(1.346)
Table 4 continued
Common tax 
effect
Tax effect by  
type of 
expansion
Baseline
Specification
Parent vs
Host
Country
Taxes
Effective
Averate
Tax Rate
Statutory
Tax Rate &
Allowances
Large & Small 
Acquirers
New & Old 
Expansion 
Location
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Control Variables:
log GDP (constant 2000 USD) -0.552*** -0.617*** -0.779*** -0.705*** -1.187*** -0.757*** -0.798*** -0.593***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.110) (0.114) (0.190) (0.112) (0.112) (0.099)
GDP growth 0.791*** 0.765*** 1.345*** 1.362*** 2.874*** 1.298*** 1.374*** 1.002***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.230) (0.276) (0.402) (0.237) (0.233) (0.202)
Cost of doing business -0.169*** -0.152*** -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.461*** -0.252*** -0.254*** -0.199***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.042) (0.045) (0.076) (0.048) (0.042) (0.041)
Business Disclosure Index -0.192*** -0.169*** -0.387*** -0.407*** -0.875*** -0.377*** -0.391*** -0.307***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.063) (0.080) (0.114) (0.074) (0.063) (0.060)
Unemployment as a % of labour force 0.255*** 0.249*** 0.370*** 0.353*** 0.739*** 0.358*** 0.377*** 0.275***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.049) (0.057) (0.077) (0.052) (0.050) (0.045)
ln(Number of Domestic Firms) -0.043*** -0.122*** -0.299*** -0.273** -1.055*** -0.273*** -0.317*** -0.096
(0.045) (0.044) (0.097) (0.109) (0.165) (0.099) (0.098) (0.085)
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.009***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Control Variables specific to CB expansions:
Contiguity of Host and Target Country 0.535*** 0.579*** 0.424*** 0.430*** 0.303** 0.431*** 0.416*** 0.422***
(0.138) (0.137) (0.140) (0.140) (0.136) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Common Language 0.792*** 0.784*** 0.589*** 0.611*** 0.931*** 0.595*** 0.580*** 0.650***
(0.154) (0.149) (0.154) (0.156) (0.156) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154)
ln(Distance between capitals of Host and Target) -0.266*** -0.245*** -0.295*** -0.309*** -0.182** -0.289*** -0.295*** -0.308***
(0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.072) (0.077) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
Common Legal System 0.348*** 0.359*** 0.596*** 0.520*** 0.530*** 0.587*** 0.608*** 0.557***
(0.116) (0.113) (0.121) (0.127) (0.112) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122)
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax (tj) 10.465*** 0.772 7.850*** 6.909*** 24.106*** 7.199*** 8.306*** 5.412**
(1.591) (3.709) (2.045) (2.623) (3.332) (2.195) (2.028) (2.203)
Maximised Log Likelihood  -5666.220 -5672.965 -5318.279 -5313.179 -5300.277 -5317.028 -5,304.810 -5,066.42
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives. The choice set consists of 18 alternatives, which corresponds to the countries 
where 99% of all cross-border acquisitions take place between the years 2014 and 2016. All specifications are random parameter logit (RPL). The RPL model allows the effect of host country tax variable (tj) to be 
random across companies. The RPL model was maximised using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. When the baseline model in column [3] was estimated allowing also the parent 
country tax variable (th) to be random across companies, we found that the mean effect was -4.647 (1.813) with standard deviation 0.642 (1.352). All models include intercepts and parent country statutory tax 
rate (th), the effects of which vary with the alternative choices. Sample size corresponds to the 7,902 parents that completed only one expansion during the three years period 2014-2016. "MNE" is a binary 
indicator for multinational enterprises as defined in the base year 2013. "Credit System" is an indicator for home countries which operate a credit system. "Large" is an indicator for parent companies that 
controlled more than 4 subsidiaries in the year 2013. Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate  that p-values are < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.
Table 5: Elasticities with respect to the host country tax rate
AT BE BR CA CH DE DK DOM ES FI FR GB IE IT NL NO RU SE US
AT -1.68 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
BE 0.02 -1.33 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
BR 0.01 0.00 -1.34 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
CA 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.56 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
CH 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -1.15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
DE 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -1.41 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
DK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ES 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 -1.40 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
FI 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.69 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
FR 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -1.20 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
GB 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 -1.29 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
IE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -1.62 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
NL 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 -1.57 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
NO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.62 0.01 0.01 0.01
RU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.67 0.00 0.00
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.68 0.01
US 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 -1.12
Note:  These elastices are based on the Random Parameter Logit Model estimates, col. [3] of Table 4. They are based on the basic results for host and home tax rates, which therefore apply to domestic acquirers. Each cross-
elasticity refers to the impact of the host country tax rate in row country on the probability of an acquirer choosing a target in the column country. The diagonals are the own-country elasticities. All elasticities are significantly 
different from zero with p<0.01.
Table 6: Random parameter logit model coefficient estimates from alternative samples
Sample Sample Sample Sample
2006-2008 2008-2010 2011-2013 2014-2016
Cross Border expansions
Host-country Statutory Tax Rate (tj) -11.935** -40.465*** -19.917*** -16.439***
(4.963) (10.160) (6.850) (6.115)
tj * MNE dummy 4.543* 23.283*** 8.733*** 6.377***
(2.512) (3.978) (2.508) (1.671)
Domestic expansions
Domestic  Statutory Tax Rate (th=tj) -2.690 0.0242 -4.989* -4.754***
(3.670) (1.158) (2.865) (1.794)
th * MNE dummy -4.860*** -1.847*** -2.174*** -4.654***
(1.523) (0.588) (0.465) (0.774)
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax on tax (tj) 5.669*** 26.633*** 11.862*** 10.766***
(2.188) (4.155) (2.873) (2.405)
Maximised Log-Likelihood -2126.30 -4,779.49 -4,890.65 -5318.279
Number of Cross-Border Expansions 563 1,020 1,036 1,136
Number of Domestic Expansions 1,439 5,318 6,760 6,766
Number of Multinational Acquirers 742 2,005 2,313 2,466
Number of Domestic Acquirers 1,260 4,333 5,483 5,436
Total Number of Expansions 2,002 6,338 7,796 7,902
Random Parameter Logit (Table 4, Col. [3])
Notes :  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives.  The 
choice set consists of 18 alternatives, which corresponds to the countries where 99% of all cross-border acquisitions take place. The effect of 
host country tax variable (t j ) is allowed to be random across companies. Maximisation used simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton 
random draws. Control variables are as in Table 4, but results omitted for simplicity of exposition. Sample size varies over time, but always 
corresponds to the parents that completed only one expansion during the three years inerval.  "MNE" is a binary indicator for multinational 
enterprises as defined one year before the begining of the three years interval.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, * 
indicate  that p-values are < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis
Baseline
Specification: 
RP Logit
Baseline
Specification:
Multinomial
Logit
Baseline, no 
Control 
Variables
Baseline, no 
Domestic 
Expansions
Baseline, all 
expansions
Baseline, all 
first expansions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cross Border expansions
Host-country Statutory Tax Rate (tj) -16.439*** -7.838 -29.161*** -0.960 -42.923*** -24.705***
(6.115) (4.776) (8.012) (4.758) (4.311) (5.845)
tj * MNE dummy 6.377*** 2.967*** 11.949*** 0.429 16.099*** 0.012***
(1.671) (0.655) (3.004) (0.765) (1.421) (1.803)
Domestic expansions
Domestic  Statutory Tax Rate (th = tj) -4.754*** -3.762** 1.446 -3.892** -5.368***
(1.794) (1.535) (1.816) (1.606) (1.646)
th * MNE dummy -4.654*** -4.478*** -4.796*** -4.544*** -4.750***
(0.774) (0.678) (0.774) (0.657) (0.707)
Standard Deviation of the RP on tax (tj) 7.850*** 14.651*** 0.126 17.687*** 11.008***
(2.045) (3.335) (2.268) (1.402) (2.087)
Maximised Log Likelihood -5,318.279 -5320.949 -6,817.337 -3,327.306 -12,332.34 -7,682.251
Number of Cross-Border Expansions 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136 2,811 1,686
Number of Domestic Expansions 6,766 6,766 6,766 - 12,203 8,783
Number of Multinational Acquirers 2,466 2,466 2,466 3,805 3,805
Number of Domestic Acquirers 5,436 5,436 5,436 6,664 6,664
Total Number of Expansions 7,902 7,902 7,902 1,136 15,014 10,469
Notes: See notes to Table 6. In addition, Column [1] is the same as Column [3] from Table 4.
  
 
 
